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Lubell: Pothole Laws

PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE STATUTES IN NEW
YORK STATE: THE RESURRECTION OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

This article will present the history of governmental and
municipal immunity, its apparent waiver, and an attempt to
rescind that waiver by way of "prior written notice" statutes,
otherwise known as "pothole laws." Prior written notice statutes

create conditions precedent to commencement of a negligence
action against a municipality. These statutes provide that before a
person may begin an action against a municipality or a municipal
corporation, for a defect in a roadway or sidewalk which caused
injury, the entity must have prior written notice of that defect or
the action may not be maintained. 1
It has been argued that through the creation of these statutes, a

litigant has virtually lost all opportunity to bring a personal injury
action against a municipality. 2 As such, these statutes are
arguably unconstitutional as they potentially deny the litigant due
process of law. 3 This comment will focus on how these laws
1. See infra notes 74-76, 78-82 and accompanying text.
2. See Abraham Fuchsberg, "Pothole" Law Described as Penaly on
Victims of Municipal Negligence, 183 N.Y. L.J. 34, col. 1 (May 1, 1980). The
author described New York City's prior notice statute as "permit[ing the City
to absolve itself of negligence." Id. In addition, he argued that it is unrealistic
to expect that ordinary citizens would ever provide such notice. Id. Fuchsberg
pointed to such practical difficulties as illiteracy in poor neighborhoods, and
the fact that ordinary citizens would not know to whom notice should be sent.
1d. As a result, New York citizens would "have their right to justice
forfeited .... " Id. However, shortly after the law went into effect, Fuchsberg
founded the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Committee. See
Howard Kurtz, The City of Deep Potholes and Deep Pockets, \VASHINGTON
POST, April 13, 1988, at A3. By performing the task of finding potholes and
dangerous sidewalks, and sending detailed maps of their locations, the Big
Apple Pothole Corporation addresses many of the practical problems
Fuchsberg detailed.
3. See Fuchsberg, "Pothole" Law Described as Penalty on Victims of
Municipal Negligence, 183 N.Y. L.J. 34, col. 1. This argument, however, has
been largely unsuccessful in New York courts. See, e.g., Holt v. County of
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affect potential litigants in New York in their attempt to seek
redress against municipalities for injuries sustained due to defects
in roadways or sidewalks.
Over the years, prior written notice statutes were enacted in an
effort to eliminate frivolous lawsuits and limit municipal
liability. 4 The question remains whether a municipal entity may
shield itself from liability in areas where it has a firmly
established common law duty.
Section I of this comment will begin with a historical
discussion of sovereign/governmental immunity from its
existence in England, and how it found its way into American
jurisprudence. Because this doctrine appears to have outlived its
acceptability, this comment will demonstrate how the waiver of
this doctrine came about. Section II will focus on the prior notice
statutes in New York and how, even though they have withstood
numerous constitutional challenges, they appear to deprive a
litigant of his or her day in court.
It is the position of this author that these statutes, as they exist
in New York, interfere with an injured party's right to seek
redress for his or her injuries in a court of law. Therefore, it is
necessary to reform these laws so that individuals are not
arbitrarily denied a right to redress.

Tioga, 95 A.D.2d 934, 935, 464 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (3d Dep't), appeal
denied, 60 N.Y.2d 560, 49 N.E.2d 195, 471 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1983). In Tioga,
the court held that "the right to sue a subdivision of the [s]tate for negligence
in the performance of a governmental function is founded upon statute and [the
legislature] may limit such right as it sees fit." Id. at 935, 464 N.Y.S.2d at
280. The law in question granted a right to sue only when prior notice of a
defective condition had been given. Id. The court interpreted the absence of
such notice as indicating that the plaintiff "never possessed a vested right to
bring an action." 1d. at 935, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 281. Additionally, the statute
had a rational basis since it enabled the county to "protect the traveling
public . . . ." Id. The court thus found no denial of due process. Id.
4. Terri J. Frank, New York City's Pothole Law: In Need of Repair, 10
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323 (1982).
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THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN/GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity was originally associated in England with
the idea that the "King can do no wrong." 5 In the thirteenth
century, during the reign of Henry III, it was recognized that the
king was immune from suit in his own courts. 6 However, it did
not follow that the monarch was above the law. 7 Rather, the king
was seen as the source of justice, and thus was duty bound to
protect the rights of his subjects, even against wrongs perpetrated
by the crown. 8 The initial formulation of remedies against the
9 Although
king began to solidify during the reign of Edward I.
there have not appeared to be any specific cases or instances
which bare substantive proof on the matter, historians have
isolated this era as the focal point of transition.
While the sovereign was permitted to deny actions seeking
redress from wrongs he committed, it seems that assent to suits
against the crown "was, in practice, granted or withheld, not as a
matter of unfettered royal discretion, but upon the basis of law that is, upon whether the petition made out a prima facie legal
claim for redress." 10 Underlying these claims was a vital
principle: a subject seeking to enforce a cause of action against
the king should be entitled to relief as if he or she were
proceeding against another subject. 11
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was recognized by the
American judiciary as part of its shared common law heritage
with England. 12 Immunities enjoyed by states and their
5. Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36
YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1926).
6. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN

IMMUNrrY 5 (1972).
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
at 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. See Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 798
(1824). The Court in Osborn stated that "[t]he immunity of one of the
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subdivisions are akin to those retained by the federal
government. 13 The doctrine was carried over on the ground that
it seemed illogical to enforce a claim against the very authority
that created the claim in the first place. 14
Municipal immunity was recognized as early as 1798 in Russell
v. Men of Devon. 15 Because municipalities were not considered
to be separate entities, a claim against one was treated as a claim
against England as a whole. 16 The courts frowned upon such
actions for many reasons, including lack of precedent, lack of
funds, or because they would divert tax funds from public
17
purposes.
The trend of judicial decisions in this country has led to the
restriction, rather than the expansion of municipal immunity. 18
Various justifications for municipal liability have been grounded
on the principal "that a remedy should be provided for every
wrong." 19 To allow an individual to remain uncompensated for
injuries sustained by the negligence of a municipality cuts against
the grain of common law negligence and equity. "That an
individual injured by the negligence of ... a municipal
corporation should bear his loss himself ... instead of having it
borne by the public treasury to which he and all other citizens
States

. .

.is not greater than that of the crown in England. The constitution

merely ordains, that a State, in its sovereign capacity, shall not be sued."
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §131, at 1043 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907). Justice Holmes

stated that "there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends." Id. at 353.
15. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) (holding that unincorporated county
was not liable for damages caused by defective bridge).

16. KEETON ETAL., supra note 13, § 131 at 1051.
17. See Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J.
129, 132-33 (1924).

18. See, e.g., Krantz v. City of Hutchinson, 196 P.2d 227, 233 (Kan.
1948) ("[T]he immunity of municipalities from liability does not extend to the
creation or maintenance of nuisances").
19. Spaur v. Pawhuska, 43 P.2d 408, 409-10 (Okla. 1935) (holding that a
municipal employee in negligence action was entitled to immunity because
street cleaning was a "governmental function" as opposed to a corporate duty).
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contribute, offends the basic principles of equality of burdens and
of elementary justice."20 Although public policy was seen as
supporting full immunity, broad governmental protection from
liability has fallen from favor with both legislative bodies and
courts. 2 1

The vast majority of states have now consented to at least some
liability for municipal torts. 22 Courts, however, have upheld
sovereign immunity for decisions which are discretionary in

nature. 23 The theory is that a municipal corporation typically
perfonns two classes of functions: 1) those which are described
as governmental or discretionary and 2) those which are

characterized as private or proprietary. 24 A governmental
20. Merrill v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 380 (N.H. 1974). The
court stated that to require an injured person to bear the loss himself "is
foreign to the spirit of [the New Hampshire Constitution's] guarantee that
every subject is entitled to a legal remedy for injuries he may receive. ....
Id.
21. See Note, Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in New York, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 84, 87 (1943).
22. See 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 53.01.10 (3d ed. 1993).
23. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 132 at 1062-66.

24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D(3)(a) (1965). Section
895D(3)(a) provides, in relevant part: "A public officer acting within the
general scope of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an
administrative act or omission if he is immune because engaged in the exercise
of a discretionary function." An act is ministerial if it is "done by officers and
employees who are required to carry out the orders of others or to administer
the law with little choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances
their acts are to be done." Id. at cmt. h. These acts are sometimes referred to
as "operational," and they operate as a shield against liability. The
Restatement lists seven factors which should be considered in determining
whether a function is discretionary, and if liability should be imposed:
(1) The nature and importance of the function that the officer is
performing ....
(2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion
by the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the
court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of government ....
(3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the
free exercise of his discretion by the officer ....
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function is one in which the municipal entity discharges a duty
owed to the general public and can only be performed adequately

by a governmental unit, for example, the operation of a police or

fire department, or the making of planning level decisions. 2 5
Proprietary functions, on the other hand, are those which a

municipal entity performs but could be supplied as well by a nongovernmental organization. 2 6 In the proprietary context, the

municipality is acting primarily for its own inhabitants, although
the general public may derive a common benefit from the
activity, such as in the maintenance and operation of streets and
sidewalks.27

Discretionary functions have been described as "those
requiring the exercise of independent judgment in arriving at a
decision or choosing a course of action." 2 8 Common law

immunity protects governmental entities against liability for these
actions. 29 The principal of separation of powers cautions against

courts second-guessing discretionary determinations made by
(4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on
the officer ....
(5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if the
action is taken ....

(6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be
produced ....
(7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other
forms of relief ....
Id. at cmt. f.
25. See Bolste v. Lawrence, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (Mass. 1917) ("The
underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the
element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit."). See also
MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, § 53.02.10; CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, 1A
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.41 (1993).
26. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, § 53.02.10; see also CHESTER JAMES
ANTIEAU, IA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.41 (1993).
27. See ROGER W. COOLEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 115-17 at 376-82 (1914).
28. RUSSELL M. LEWIS, NATIONAL COOPERATIvE HIGHWAY RESEARCH
PROGRAM, 106 PRACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR MINIMIZING TORT LIABILITY 9

(December 1983).
29. LEWIS, supra note 28, at 9.
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executive entities, and there is a belief that juries are not able to
properly analyze discretionary governmental decisions. 30
31
Ministerial functions are tasks which are explicitly defined.
These functions do not receive the immunity which is afforded to
discretionary functions because there is no requirement to weigh
the alternatives, and the performance of these functions requires
little exercise of personal judgment. 32 When, by statute, a
municipality undertakes the duty to maintain roadways and
sidewalks, this function has often been classified as a ministerial
function, and therefore, the municipal entity is generally subject
to suit. 3 3 However, unless the entity's duties are clearly defined,
it is arguable that such a function may fall under the discretionary
category.
In assigning a dual character to the functions of municipal
corporations, the courts have held that when a municipality or
other governmental entity exercises a governmental function, it
will be immune from liability in tort. 34 However, when a
municipality acts in a proprietary capacity, tort liability is
determined under the same principles applied to private persons
35
or to private corporations.
By the early to mid-twentieth century, state after state began
abrogating the rule of governmental and municipal immunity. As
the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out in Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit DistrictNo. 302,36 the doctrine of governmental
immunity
runs
"directly
counter
to
the
basic
concept... underlying the whole law of torts that liability
30. LEwis, supra note 28, at 9.
31.
32.
33.
34.

LEWIs, supra note 28, at 9.
LEwis, supra note 28, at 9.
LEWIS, supra note 28, at 9.
MCQUILLiN, supra note 22, § 53.02.

35. See Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 163 P. 670, 675 (Cal. 1917)
(stating that the defendant municipality acted in a private capacity and was held
to the same legal standard as a private owner); see also Munick v. City of
Durham, 106 S.E. 665, 669 (N.C. 1921) (holding that a municipality acting in
business capacity was liable as thought it was a business corporation).
36. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89
(M11.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
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follows negligence. ", 3 7 The court concluded that the doctrine was
"unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, and has no place in
modem day society." ' 38 Similarly, after the governmental
immunity rule regarding tort liability was re-evaluated, in
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, the Supreme Court of

California held that "it must be discarded as mistaken and
unjust. ,

39

The majority rule holds that absent a statute which provides
immunity, the municipality will be liable for negligence in the
identical capacity as a corporation or private individual. 40
Common law governmental or sovereign immunity, previously
available to municipalities as an affirmative defense in tort
41
claims, is now a viable defense in only a few states.
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity found its way into
our legal system, it has never been accepted without limitations
imposed by the courts. 42 The principle that a sovereign,

governmental, or municipal entity may consent to suit and
thereby waive its immunity is an ancient axiom of western
jurisprudence, and this principle was expressed in a variety of
court opinions during the early years of the republic. 4 3 It has
become increasingly accepted that public policy supports a more
expansive view of municipal liability: "Considerations of fair
play and justice suggest that those injured by the negligence of a
37. Id. at 93.

38. Id.at 96.
39. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 359 P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961).
The court held that "the doctrine of governmental immunity for torts for which
its agents are liable has no place in our law . . . . " Id. at 463.
40. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, at 126.
41. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, at 126.
42. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, at 133.

43. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (stating
that an independent sovereign state can be sued when it gives consent as well

as when it is stated in a law); see also Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 257 (1837). The Court in Briscoe stated that a sovereign state cannot

be sued unless it gives consent, and that pursuant to the Articles of
Confederation, the only time a state may be sued is in boundary conflicts. Id.
at 321.
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municipality should be compensated on equal terms with those
injured by individuals or private corporations." 44 This is due to
the fact that the underlying principle of sovereign or
governmental immunity has been deemed contrary to the
proposition that liability follows negligence. 45 Further, the
doctrine directly contradicts the constitutional guarantee that each
person is to be afforded legal recourse for injuries sustained to
his person or property. 46
The immunity of municipalities from tort liability has been
eroded by statutes which waive substantive immunity in certain
arenas of activity, such as the operation of vehicles, defective or
dangerous streets, alleys, or other public thoroughfares and
public property. 47 As early as 1861, the Supreme Court noted
that "[c]ities and towns are required, by statute, in most or all of
the ... States, to keep their highways safe and convenient for
travelers ... and if they neglect that duty, and suffer them to get

out of repair and defective, and anyone receives injury through
such defect ... the delinquent corporation is responsible in

damages to the injured party." 48
Municipal liability is predicated on a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity, which can only be accomplished by
legislative action. 49 After realizing the severe consequences of

44. Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Ark. 1957)
(affirming trial court's decision which held that the maintenance of a municipal
airport was a governmental function and thus the defendant municipality was
not liable).
45. Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
46. See MCQuiLLIN, supra note 22, at 132.
47. See Snyder v. City of Binghamton, 138 Misc. 259, 261, 245 N.Y.S.
497, 499 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1930) (citing statute enacted to hold the
city liable for the negligence of a person who operated a municipally-owned
vehicle), aff'd, 233 A.D. 782, 250 N.Y.S. 917 (3d Dep't 1931).
48. Weightman v. Corporation of Washington, 66 U.S. (I Black) 39, 52
(1861). Because by statute, the District of Columbia had affirmatively
undertaken the duty to maintain its bridges and roadways in a reasonably safe
condition, it could not escape liability by seeking to hide behind the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Id. at 49-50
49. See Harry H. Lipsig, Sovereign Immunity, 190 N.Y. L.J., December
22, 1983 at 1.
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absolute sovereign immunity, the New York Legislature passed
laws which eliminated this immunity, 50 culminating in the
passage of Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act in 1929,51 which
made the state and municipalities liable for torts occurring in the
exercise of governmental functions. 52 Section 8 of the Court of
Claims Act provides that: "The state hereby waives its immunity
from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and
consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations ....,,53

Section 8 has been interpreted as evidencing a strong legislative
intent that no wronged individual should be forced to contribute
the whole of his loss to society, and that the entity who performs
or profits by the service, and whose performance has caused that
loss should contribute to restore the individual party. 5 4 However,
the specific effect of this waiver as applied to municipalities has
confounded the courts. 55 While it was clear that municipal
immunity was a derivative of state liability, it appeared that the
legislature did not intend to abrogate municipal immunity with

50. See Jill A. Abramow, Survey of New York Practice; Court of Claims
Act, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199, 200 n.66 (1983).
51. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1989); see also Act of April 10,
1929, ch. 467, § 12-a, 1929 N.Y. Laws 994.
52. See Abramow, supra note 50; see also Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295
N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1945). The court in Steitz stated that:
"The waiver of sovereign immunity by section 8 (formerly s 12-a) of
the Court of Claims Act has rendered the defendant municipality liable,
equally with individuals and private corporations, for the wrongs of its
officers and employees. In each case, however, liability must be
'determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to
actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations."'
Id. at 54, 64 N.E.2d at 705.
53. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1989); see also Act of April 10,
1929, ch. 467, § 12-a, 1929 N.Y. Laws 994.
54. Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 166, 7
N.E.2d 28, 29 (1937).
55. William J. Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 278, 285 (1948).
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the enactment of section 8.56 The statute intends "to bind the
state," however, it does not necessarily follow that the legislature
57
also wanted the statute to apply to municipal subdivisions.

Without language which specifically included these subdivisions
within its scope, municipalities which conducted governmental
58
functions were arguably not within the purview of the statute.
The New York Court of Appeals resolved the issue in
Bernardine v. City of New York. 5 9 The court held that because
the city's immunity was an extension of the state's, it naturally
ceased by virtue of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, and
therefore the "civil divisions of the State are answerable equally

with individuals and corporations. "60 It was with Bernardine that
municipal immunity in New York finally terminated. 6 1 Thus,
when immunity was waived by the state, the immunity enjoyed
by subdivisions was also abrogated, 6 2 because "since civil
divisions of the State ... have no independent sovereignty, when
. . [the] immunity of municipal
the
same
extent." 63
disappeared
to
components

the State waived its immunity.

56. Chester James Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort
Liability, 4 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 351, 370 (1957).
57. Engels v. City of New York, 256 A.D. 992, 993, 110 N.Y.S.2d 641,
642 (2d Dep't ), aff'd, 281 NY 650, 22 N.E.2d 481 (1939) The court in
Engles stated that "Statutes in derogation of the sovereignty of a State must be
strictly construed and a waiver of immunity from liability must be clearly
expressed." Id.
58. Id.
59. 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In Bernadine, plaintiff was
injured when struck by a runaway police horse. Id. at 364, 62 N.E.2d at 60405. The Court rejected as unnecessary the governmental/proprietary
distinction, thus making municipalities subject to the same negligence liabilities
as private persons and corporations. Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605.
60. Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605.
61. Id.
62. See Berean v. Town of Lloyd, 5 A.D.2d 924, 925, 172 N.Y.S.2d 301,
302 (3d Dep't 1958) ("When the State waived its immunity the civil divisions
of the State likewise waived a derivative immunity.").

63. Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 82 A.D.2d 350, 357, 441 N.Y.S.2d 275,
279 (2d Dep't 1981), aft'd, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 339, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1108, 452
N.Y.S.2d 347, 351 (1982) (holding that the State of New York and its
subdivisions are not subject to punitive damages).
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PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE STATUTES
According to common law, municipalities have a duty to keep
64
their streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition.
Maintaining public streets and ways so that they are reasonably
safe for use by the general public is usually considered to be a
proprietary function. 65 As a result, a municipality is liable for the
negligent performance of this duty. 66
Statutes can limit both a municipality's liability due to defects
in the streets and sidewalks, and the rights enjoyed by persons
who travel. 67 Liability under such statutes is limited by the
provisions of the statutes. 68 At common law in most
jurisdictions, if a municipality causes a defect in a street or a
sidewalk, it is liable regardless of whether it has received notice
of the defect. 69 Even today, a municipal defendant is not entitled
to raise a prior written notice defense where the municipality
itself caused or created the condition led to the plaintiff's
injuries. 70 However, without a statute imposing absolute liability,
a public corporation may not be held liable for injuries resulting
from conditions which it has not created unless it had actual
knowledge, or notice of the defect for a sufficient length of time
prior to the accident to have remedied the condition. 7 1
64. 19 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 54.03b at 16 (3d ed. 1985).
65. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 131, at 1054 (5th ed. 1984).
66. See MCQUILLIN, supra, note 64, § 54.03b at 16.
67. 3 E.C. YOKELY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 161 at 82 (1958).

68. Id.
69. Rupp v. New York City Transit Auth., 15 A.D.2d 800, 801, 224
N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Dep't 1962) (holding that city was liable for injuries

sustained by infant when street collapsed under bus because the city had a
nondelegable duty to maintain public thoroughfares).
70. Parks v. Hutchins, 78 N.Y.2d 1049, 1051, 581 N.E.2d 1339, 1340,
576 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (1991).
71. See Cohen v. New York, 204 N.Y. 424, 426-27, 97 N.E. 866, 867

(1912) (holding that a city was not liable for failure to correct defect caused by
*severe storm only four hours prior to accident); see also DuPont v. Port
Chester, 204 N.Y. 351, 355, 97 N.E. 735, 736-37 (1912) (holding that a
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Some statutes and charter provisions require actual rather than

constructive notice of the defect to the municipality as a precondition to municipal liability. 72 Constructive notice, in some
situations, has also been deemed good and sufficient notice by
specific statutory provisions. 73 For example, certain statutes,
such as Town Law section 65-a, 74 Second Class Cities Law
municipality was not liable where snowstorms had temporarily caused all
crosswalks to be covered with snow); Clemmons v. Cominskey, I A.D.2d
933, 934, 149 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (holding that a municipality was not liable
for failure to correct sunken blacktop on sidewalk because a reasonably
prudent person would not have walked over it), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 958, 142
N.E.2d 425, 162 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1957).
72. Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 54 P.2d 725, 726 (Cal. 1936). The
court in Nicholson held that where a sidewalk defect was inconspicous, and no
actual notice was given to the municipality, plaintiff failed "to bring home to
the defendant city a neglect of its duty of inspection or knowledge of facts
which would have put it upon inquiry, [and] the city cannot be held to have
had constructive notice of the defect." Id. at 728.
73. Constructive notice is said to exist when a municipality is aware of
facts and circumstances which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, would
lead to the knowledge required. See 19 EUGENE McQUILLEN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 54.109 at 339:
charter
or
ordinance
statute,
by
required
"Unless
provision... [c]onstructive notice [of a 'defect] is sufficient.
Constructive notice means notice which the law imputes from the
circumstances of the case and is based on the theory that negligent
ignorance is nor less a breach of duty than willful neglect, and that
negligence in not knowing of the dangerous condition may be shown by
circumstances."

Id.
74. N.Y. ToWN LAW § 65-a (McKinney 1987) provides in pertinent part:
1. No civil action shall be maintained against any town ... for
damages or injuries to person or property sustained by reason of
any highway... being defective, out of repair, unsafe, dangerous
or obstructed unless written notice of such defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed condition of such highway... was
actually given to the town clerk or town superintendent of
highways, and that there was a failure or neglect within a
reasonable time after the giving of such notice to repair or remove
the defect, danger or obstruction complained of, or, in the absence
of such notice, unless such defective, unsafe, dangerous, or
obstructed condition existed for so long a period that the same
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section 244, 7 5 and Highway Law section 13976 have a
requirement of either constructive notice or prior written notice
77
as a prerequisite to maintaining an action for damages.

Conversely, Village Law section 6-628,78 and the infamous New
York City "Pothole" Law 7 9 will impose liability only after a

2.

should have been discovered and remedied in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence ....
No civil action shall be maintained against any town... for
damages or injuries to person or property sustained by reason of
any defect in its sidewalks ... unless written notice thereof,
specifying the particular place, was actually given to the town
clerk or to the town superintendent of highways, and there was a
failure or neglect to cause such defect to be remedied ... or to
make the place otherwise reasonably safe within a reasonable time
after the receipt of such notice.

Id.
75. N.Y. SECOND CLASs CITIEs LAW § 244 (McKinney 1987 and Supp.
1994).
76. N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 139 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
77. Brian J. Shoot, PRIOR WRITrEN NOTICE, 19 TRIAL LAW. Q. 27
(Spring 1988).
78. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 6-628 (McKinney 1983). Section 6-628 provides
in pertinent part:
No civil action shall be maintained against the village for damages or
injuries to person or property sustained in consequence of any street,
highway ... sidewalk or crosswalk being defective, out of repair,
unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed ... unless written notice of the
defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition... was actually
given to the village clerk and there was a failure or neglect within a
reasonable time after the receipt of such notice to repair or remove the
defect, danger or obstruction complained of ... or the place otherwise
made reasonably safe.
Id.
79. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 7-201(c)(2) (1985). Section 7-201(c)(2)
provides in pertinent part:
2. No civil action shall be maintained against the city for damage to
property or injury to person or death sustained in consequence of
any street, highway ... sidewalk or crosswalk, or any part or
portion of any of the foregoing including any encumbrances
thereon or attachments thereto, being out of repair, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed, unless it appears that written notice of the
defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition, was actually
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showing of prior written notice. 80 In any event, New York courts
have consistently required that municipal entities be given notice
of a defect, either actual or constructive, before being held liable
81
for damages.

New York prior written notice provisions are statutory
offspring of General Municipal Law section 50-g, which sets
forth and delineates the applicable guidelines for a municipal

entity to adhere to in conjunction with the statutory provisions. 82
Because a municipal corporation is an agent of the state and
exercises part of the state's sovereign power, the New York
given to the commissioner of transportation... and there was a
failure or neglect within fifteen days after the receipt of such
notice to repair or remove the defect, danger or obstruction
complained of, or the place otherwise made reasonably safe.
Id.
80. See Shoot, supra note 77, at 27.
81. See, e.g., Rothenberg v. City of New Rochelle, 285 A.D. 817, 818,
136 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467-68 (2d Dep't 1955) (holding that either actual or
constructive notice of a hole in the sidewalk must be given to a municipality
before it can be held liable).
82. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-g (McKinney 1986 and Supp. 1994).
Section 50-g provides in pertinent part:
1. Wherever any statute, city charter or local law provides that no
civil action shall be maintained against a city for damages or
injuries to person or property sustained in consequence of any
street, highway... sidewalk or crosswalk being out of repair,
unsafe, dangerous or obstructed... unless it appear that written
notice of the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed
condition... was actually given... and there was a failure or
neglect within a reasonable time after the giving of such notice to
repair or remove the defect, danger or obstruction complained
of. ... or the place otherwise made reasonably safe, the city shall
keep an indexed record ... of all written notices which it shall
receive.., which record shall state the date of receipt of the
notice, the nature and location of the condition stated to exist, and
the name and address of the person from whom the notice is
received ....
3. This section shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent
provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limitation
contained in the provision of any city charter.
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Court of Appeals has held that a municipality may grant, deny,
83
or restrict the power to maintain a private action against it.
It has been argued that prior written notice statutes put a harsh
and extraordinary burden on an injured person, 8 4 "are in
derogation of the common law,"85 are unconstitutional, 86 and are
simply devices to reinstate governmental immunity. 87 However,
in examining the New York State Constitution together with local
statutes, it can be demonstrated that, although the prior written
notice statutes are valid under the state constitution, they serve no
purpose other than to insulate municipal corporations from
88
liability, undermining the waiver of governmental immunity.
The New York State Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"[E]very local government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with... [the] constitution or any
general law [of the state] ... relating to ... [t]he acquisition,
83. See MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 187 N.Y. 37, 47-48, 79 N.E.
863, 866 (1907) (concluding that the legislature conditioned a municipality's
liability for sidewalk defects upon the receipt of written notice).
84. See Doremus v. Inc. Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362, 365, 222
N.E.2d 376, 377, 275 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (1966) (holding that prior written
notice statutes are to be construed strictly against a municipality because "they
are in derogation of the common law"). In Doremus, a defective stop sign was
found not to fall within a local statute requiring written notice to the
municipality of roadway defects. Id. But see Weisman v. Town of
Brookhaven, 197 A.D.2d 617, 618, 602 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (2d Dep't 1993)
(noting that town's notice provisions regarding stop signs would not
retrospectively apply to plaintiff's claim).
85. See Zumbo v. Town of Farmington, 60 A.D.2d 350, 354, 401
N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (4th Dep't 1978) (holding that prior written notice of a
baseball field's unsafe condition was not a requirement in order to sue the
town).
86. See Frank, supra note 4, at 334.
87. See Frank, supra note 4, at 334.
88. See Fullerton v. C'ity of Schenectady, 285 A.D. 545, 548, 138
N.Y.S.2d 916, 919-20 (3d Dep't), afid, 309 N.Y. 701, 128 N.E.2d 413
(1955). The Fullerton court stated that although local laws of this type are
basically attempts to bar tort action by requiring specific procedures to be
followed, the law in question did not violate the state constitution or statutes
present at the time of its enactment, and was therefore valid. Id. at 545, 138
N.Y.S.2d at 919-20.
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care, management, and use of its... streets... and
property." 89 Similarly, the City Home Rule Law mirrors the
language of the New York State Constitution. 90 And even though
the Court of Claims Act 91 waives immunity of the state and its
subdivisions so that each is amenable to suit, the statutory
authority which permits political subdivisions to limit their
liability in suits arising from street and sidewalk defects of which
92
they had no prior written notice prevails.
General Municipal Law controls in this argument. Because
section 50-g of the General Municipal Law 93 authorizes such
statutory creations, one must read into the entire statute. The law
specifically states that "this section shall be applicable
notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general,
special, or local, or any limitation contained in the provisions of
any... charter." 94 And furthermore, New York Construction
and Interpretation Law provides, in part, that "whenever there is
a general and a particular provision in the same statute, the
general does not overrule the particular but applies only where
the particular enactment is inapplicable." 95 Accordingly,
statutory authority prevails over any waiver which the state has
made. New York State courts have often characterized prior
96
notice statutes as harsh, but have consistently upheld them.
The constitutionality of laws requiring notice of defects as a
condition precedent to liability for damages or injury has
89. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(i) and (6) (McKinney 1987).
90. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAw § 10(l)(a)(6) (McKinney 1987). Section
10(1)(a)(6) provides that local governments shall have the "power to adopt and
amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not
inconsistent with any general law, relating to... [t]he acquisition, care,
management and use of its highways, roads, streets, avenues and property."

Id.
91. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8; see also Act of April 10, 1929, ch. 467, § 12a, 1929 N.Y. Laws 994.
92. See N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW § 244.
93. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-g.
94. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-g(3).
95. N.Y. CONST. & INTERP. LAw (McKinney 1971 and Supp. 1994).
96. 3 YOKELY MUN. CoRps. supra note 67 at § 2.461.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 4

TOURO LA W REVIEW

[Vol 10

consistently been upheld in other jurisdictions. 97 Additionally,
local statutes which are more rigid than the general laws of the
State have been upheld as well. 98 Where a municipality exercises
the legislative power delegated to it by the state constitution,
there is "an exceedingly strong presumption that the local law
enacted is constitutional." 99 Therefore, in order to successfully

challenge a local law, a plaintiff must overcome the strong
presumption of constitutionality that attaches to such a law. 100
The Municipal Home Rule Law1 01 allows municipal

corporations to override state statutes that "relate to matters
which

. . .

are proper subjects for local legislation unless the

Legislature is shown to have expressly prohibited the enactment
of such a local law." 10 2 Furthermore, a municipal corporation
may, under certain conditions, enact laws that conflict with a

97. See Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 48
A.2d 593, 598 (Md. 1946) (stating that the legislature has the authority to
require written notice before an action against a municipal corporation for
damages is commenced); Schigley v. City of Waseca, 118 N.W. 259, 262
(Minn. 1908) (holding that a charter provision requiring that actual notice in
writing be given to a municipality before a person may recover damages was
an effective act of the legislature).
98. See Holt v. County of Tioga, 56 N.Y.2d 414, 437 N.E.2d 1140, 452
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1982). The Holt court stated that although the local law was
more rigid than the general law, the purpose for not specifically addressing
prior notification in the general laws was to give local governments the chance
to address this issue themselves. Id. at 420, 437 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 385-86. The court upheld the local law, finding that it was
constitutional, and not inconsistent with the general law. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Zumbo, 60 A.D.2d at 352, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 122. See also
Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11, 359 N.E.2d 337, 34041, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1976) (stating that there is an "exceedingly strong
presumption of Constitutionality" that applies to both legislative enactments
and municipal ordinances).
101. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(l)(a)(6) (McKinney 1987).
102. Walker. v. Town of Hempstead, 190 A.D.2d 364, 371, 598 N.Y.S.2d
550, 554 (2d Dep't 1993) (reinstating plaintiff's cause of action for injuries
sustained on town property despite lack of written notice because local law did
not express intent to supersede state statute).
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general law. 10 3 "In the absence of any clear expression of
legislative intent to prohibit [municipal corporations] from
superseding [state statutory law], the enactment of local laws in
these and other defined areas is generally permitted." 104 "And by
not specifically addressing the question of prior notification, it
appears that the legislature deferred to the judgment of local
governments." 105
Although New York has held that prior written notice statutes
pass muster under the New York State Constitution, others have
argued that they should not survive a challenge pursuant to the
Equal Protection Clause 10 6 of the United States Constitution. The
prior written notice statutes fail to see and treat all torffeasors
equally under the law "by arbitrarily dividing all torffeasors into
two classes: private ... to whom no prior notice of defect is
owed and minicipal... to whom prior notice is owed." 107
Accordingly, the victims are denied equal protection under the
law. However, the equal protection argument fails because all
victims in these types of cases are required to show prior written
notice, and the burden is thus not randomly and arbitrarily
08
apportioned. 1
A state statute will pass constitutional muster if its purpose
serves a rational basis. 10 9 Several courts in other states have held
that the creation of such classes does not bear a rational
relationship to the purposes underlying the statutes. 1 1 0
103. Holt, 56 N.Y.2d at 419, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
104. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 369, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
105. Holt, 56 N.Y.2d at 420, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
relevant part: "[N]o state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
107. Frank, supra note 4, at 338.
108. Holt, 95 A.D.2d at 935, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 281 (3d Dep't 1983).
109. See Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)
(stating that a contested state statute will be considered to be within the powers
of the state with respect to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless it has no reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary).
110. See Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich.
1972) (holding that the class division of governmental or private tortfeasors
was not rationally related to the purpose of a prior notice statute); see also
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Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court announced in
Hunter v. Mason High School11 1 that by waiving sovereign
immunity, the government places itself in a position equal to that
of private persons and corporations, and forfeits the right to a
112
special status separate from that of individuals.
Prior written notice statutes were enacted to limit municipal
liability, 113 and to reduce the amount of money paid out in
sidewalk and roadway claims. 1 14 Courts in other jurisdictions

have stated that a municipality's financial problems do not justify
shielding it from liability. 115 Additionally, Hunter also held that
protection of the public treasury is not a valid purpose for
upholding notice statutes. 1 16 Accordingly, in light of such
holdings, it is hard to fathom that the New York State notice
statutes are supported by a constitutionally legitimate basis.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that there is a definite call for reform with regard to
the prior written notice statutes. Even though budgetary
problems, in some way, created the need for change in "common
Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879, 883 (Nev. 1973) (holding that the arbitrary
line drawn between the requirement of written notice for victims of a
governmental tort but not a private tort violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079; Hunter v. North
Mason High School, 539 P.2d 845, 850 (Wash. 1975) (stating that the
governmental purpose of protecting the public treasury is not sufficient to save
a notice requirement in governmental tort actions statute from violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
I11. 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975).
112. Id. at 850.
113. See Shoot, supra note 77, at 27.
114. See Durst, Prior Written Notice for Municipal Liability, 13 Trial
Lawyer's Q. 52 (1980).
115. See Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45, 50-51 (Ark. 1968) The court in
Parish stated that "[alnything short of financial disaster ...

is insufficient

reason for exempting the cities from the rule of tort liability." Id. at 50. See
also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 882 (Pa. 1973)
(stating that empirical data does not support the finding that governmental
functions would be obstructed if funds were diverted to pay tort claims).
116. Hunter, 539 P.2d at 850.
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law principles of municipal liability," 117 one must question
whether these statutes limit a municipality's liability in the most
efficient and equitable manner possible.
This author has found no states other than New York which
require written notice of a defect before the injury occurs.
Therefore, it seems logical, according to the common law rules
of negligence, to impose a standard on a municipality similar to
that imposed on individuals and corporations. To do anything less
would truly run counter to the spirit and meaning behind section
8 of the New York Court of Claims Act. 118
By placing the same standard of negligence on municipalities, a
stronger incentive exists to inspect and repair the roadways and
sidewalks in order to avoid liability. As it stands now, unless a
good citizen has the decency to report every defect he or she
sees, the municipality enjoys a legal windfall at the expense of
individuals who become injured due to an unreported defect. And
although certain municipalities do accept less than written notice,
the procedural hurdles imposed on a litigant nearly as
burdensome as those which require strictly written notice. 119
By creating a more efficient manner of receiving notice,
combined with a fairer standard imposed on both the municipality
and litigant, the balance between the hardships placed on litigants
and the benefits to the municipalities will be brought into much
closer harmony. Anything less results in a sham of our legal
system as we know it today. Yes, there must be some latitude
granted to municipal corporations in attempting to deal with the
everyday management and maintenance of its roadways and
sidewalks, but not to an extent which results in an inordinate
degree of prejudice to injured individuals.
Lewis J. Lubell

117. See Frank, supra note 4, at 348.
118. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8; see also Act of April 10, 1929, ch. 467, § 12a, 1929 N.Y. Laws 994.
119. See supra notes 74-76, and 78-79.
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